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’Silly old owl. Doesn’t he know, there’s no such thing as a Gruffalo!’ [1] 29 
  30 
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ABSTRACT 31 
Alike the little mouse of the Gruffalo’s tale, many harmless preys use intimidating deceptive signals as anti-32 
predator strategies. For example, several caterpillars display eyespots and face-like colour patterns that are 33 
thought to mimic the face of snakes as  deterrents to insectivorous birds. We develop a theoretical model 34 
to investigate the hypothesis that these defensive strategies exploit adaptive cognitive biases of birds, 35 
which make them much more likely to confound caterpillars with snakes than vice versa. By focusing on the 36 
information-processing mechanisms of decision making, the model assumes that, during prey assessment, 37 
the bird accumulates noisy evidence supporting either the snake-escape or the caterpillar-attack motor 38 
responses, which  compete against each other for execution. Competition terminates when the evidence 39 
for either one of the responses reaches a critical threshold. This model predicts a strong asymmetry and a 40 
strong negative correlation between the prey- and the predator-decision thresholds, which increase with 41 
the increasing risk of snake predation and assessment uncertainty. The threshold asymmetry causes an 42 
asymmetric distribution of false-negative and false-positive errors in the snake-caterpillar decision plane, 43 
which makes birds much more likely to be deceived by the intimidating signals of snake-mimicking 44 
caterpillars than by the alluring signals of caterpillar-mimicking snakes. 45 
 46 
Keywords: decision making; cognitive bias; mimicry 47 
 48 
  49 
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INTRODUCTION 50 
The Gruffalo is a loved children’s tale [1] about a little, harmless mouse, who ventures in a deep dark wood 51 
searching for food. During the search, the mouse survives, in turn, to a fox, an owl and a snake by telling 52 
them about his friend, the Gruffalo, an imaginary monster, who is coming there to meet the mouse and 53 
whose favourite food just happens to be a fox, an owl and a snake. But then the mouse encounters the 54 
Gruffalo, who not only appears to be frightening real, but also hungry for mice. Once more, the clever 55 
mouse manages to survive by convincing the Gruffalo to be him, the mouse, the one to be scared of. In 56 
fact, following the mouse back through the forest, the Gruffalo is impressed by the terrified reaction that 57 
the mouse (with the Gruffalo) induces to the snake, the owl and the fox and when the mouse finally 58 
announces that his “tummy is beginning to rumble” and that his “favourite food is Gruffalo crumble”, the 59 
monster quickly turns and flees, letting the mouse savouring his nuts. 60 
This nice children story is about the “irrational” nature of fear, which makes us (the Gruffaloes) to believe 61 
the unbelievable, and to succumb to the power of intimidating deceptions. In this sense and from an 62 
evolutionary point of view, this story is also a metaphor of the defensive strategies that several harmless 63 
preys have adopted to deceive their predators. Paradigmatic examples of intimidating deception are the 64 
many tropical species of caterpillars and pupae, which display eyespots and other face-like colour patterns 65 
that mimic the face of predators of their own predators, the small insectivorous birds [2]. These 66 
morphological traits are often accompanied by postures and locomotory behaviours that reinforce the 67 
threat display: for example, when disturbed, some caterpillars inflate their anterior segments improving the 68 
resemblance to a snake-head model [3] or even palpitate their posterior eyespots producing the effect of a 69 
blinking vertebrate eye [4]. Although spectacular, eyespots and face-like colour patterns do not closely 70 
resemble any particular predator model and their evolutionary success as a survival strategy should be 71 
found in their ability to exploit a pre-existing bias in the predator’s cognitive mechanisms of decision 72 
making. Alike the mouse of the Gruffalo tale, caterpillars succeed in their deception because natural 73 
selection has predisposed their predators to be deceived. 74 
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Cognitive biases in decision making are systematic errors in the judgment of the world and are widespread 75 
in humans and non-humans animals [5]. Although some cognitive biases are likely the side-effect of our 76 
limited capacity of processing and storing sensory information [6],  other cognitive biases may indeed 77 
represent adaptive solutions in the use of the information made available by the environment [7]. For 78 
example, when the environment made information uncertain and costly to acquire, natural selection is 79 
expected to favour ‘fast and frugal’ decision rules that bias the probability of decision errors in the less 80 
expensive direction [8]. In antagonistic interactions, when the rival quality can be only poorly assessed, 81 
overconfidence and bravery is expected to evolve if the costs of ‘false-positive’ (i.e. the missed reward due 82 
to overestimation of risks) overcome (of a certain proportion) the costs of ‘false-negative’ (i.e. the costs of 83 
defeat due to underestimation of risks) [9] (see also supplementary materials A1). 84 
In the present paper, we explore the hypothesis that “irrational fear” (the psychological condition induced 85 
by an overestimation of risks) has been favoured by natural selection because of the disproportional high 86 
costs of ‘false-negative’ relative to ‘false-positive’ errors in predator recognition. To investigate this 87 
hypothesis, we develop a sequential-sampling model of decision making [10-12]. In this model, decision 88 
makers integrate noisy evidence over time and make decisions when the accumulated evidence reaches a 89 
given threshold. Sequential-sampling models are dynamic variants of signal detection models [13], which 90 
have long been the classic approach in behavioural ecology for investigating optimal animal decisions under 91 
perceptual uncertainty [14,15]. 92 
The model 93 
Imagine an insectivorous bird, searching for caterpillars in the dense foliage of a forest. As the bird is flying 94 
about, it is facing the risk of being spotted by its predator, the Sparrow Hawk. But the search is worth the 95 
risk, because if the bird fails to find enough preys today, it will not survive until tomorrow. Suddenly, the 96 
bird spots something moving slowly in front of it. If the stimulus is recognized as a caterpillar, the bird will 97 
attack. If it is recognized as a snake, the bird will flee away from it. If it is recognized as a millipede (which 98 
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we assume to be neither an edible prey nor a dangerous predator), the bird will ignore it and pass on. To 99 
decide, the bird needs a cognitive machinery that can process information both rapidly and accurately. But 100 
rapidity and accuracy conflict each other and, under conditions of uncertainty, the cognitive machinery 101 
should make optimal trade-offs between these two opposing demands.  102 
To model the bird’s decision process, we assume that its cognitive machinery is composed by two 103 
computational modules: the Caterpillar C-module and the Snake S-module, which control, respectively, the 104 
prey-attack and the predator-escape motor responses. By accumulating independent pieces of evidence, 105 
the modules compete against each other for execution of the motor response. Competition terminates 106 
(and choice is made) when the evidence for either one of the motor responses reaches a critical threshold. 107 
Since assessments are uncertain and prone to error, the bird is assumed to obtain a sequence of 108 
, … observations and to assign to each of them a score of “snakeness” (s) and “caterpillarness” (c), 109 
which may be viewed as the perceived perceptual distance from an internal image of snakes and 110 
caterpillars.  111 
Let be    and 	 the scores obtained from the observation. Let be 
  the probability of perceiving 112 
the stimulus   when the inspected animal is a snake and 
, when it is not a snake (thus, when it is 113 
either a caterpillar or a millipede). Similarly, let be 
	  the probability of perceiving the stimulus 	 114 
when the inspected animal is a caterpillar and 
	, when it is either a snake or a millipede.  The S- 115 
and C- modules are assumed to compute the log-likelihood ratios of the snake and caterpillar hypotheses, 116 
respectively (see [16] and Figure S1 in the supplementary materials): 117 
 = log | |, ,                    	 = log | |,. 118 
 and 	 are thus the coordinates of the observation   in the bi-dimensional decision plane 119 
described by the S- and C- dimensions.  120 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume the likelihoods to be normally distributed. Specifically, 
|  and 121 

	|  are assumed to have mean d and variance  , whereas 
|, and 
	, are assumed to 122 
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have mean -d and similar variance  . Under these simplifying assumptions, the amount of evidence  123 
supporting   (or, equivalently, the amount of evidence 	 supporting  ) is  = 2"  ⁄  (or 124 
	 = 2"	  ⁄ ). 125 
So far, we have described how the C- and S- computational modules are assumed to process a single piece 126 
of information. However, since the acquired information is often noisy and the evaluation often uncertain 127 
(i.e.   ≫ 0), the bird may need several pieces of information before committing to one of the alternative 128 
hypotheses (thus, before either attacking, fleeing or ignoring the stimulus). For this reason, we assume that 129 
the computational modules accumulate over time independent pieces of evidence, which are normally 130 
distributed in the two-dimensional decision plane with covariance matrices & = '()*+* 00 ()*+* , and means, 131 
respectively, -)*+* , − )*+* / if a snake, -− )*+* , )*+* / if a caterpillar, and -− )*+* , − )*+* / if a millipede. Notice that 132 
the two axes of the decision plane are assumed orthogonal (i.e. zero covariance between  and , but see 133 
A2 in the supplementary materials for a discussion of this assumption). After n samples, the inspected 134 
animal will be represented in the decision plane by a point with coordinates 012, 123, where: 135 
12 = 12 − 1 + )+* 2 ,          12 = 12 − 1 + )+* 	2    EQ. 1 136 
are the amounts of evidence for the snake and caterpillar hypotheses, respectively. 137 
Eq. 1 describes a random-walk processes on the decision plane, with transition probabilities that depend 138 
only on the type of stimulus processed.  139 
Choice depends on 1 and 1, and the decision is made as soon as one of these variables reaches its critical 140 
threshold. Specifically, we assume that each dimension has two thresholds (6 and −7, 6 and −7).  The 141 
lines 1 = 6, 1 = 6 are the upper absorbing barriers for the process: when 1 ≥ 6 and 1 < 6  the bird 142 
chooses the escape response, conversely, when 1 < 6 and 1 ≥ 6  it chooses the attack response. The 143 
lines 1 = −7, 1 = −7  are the lower decision thresholds: when 1 ≤ −7 and 1 ≤ −7  both the snake 144 
and the caterpillar hypotheses are rejected, and the bird concludes that the inspected animal is a millipede. 145 
Page 7 of 26
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/prsb
Submitted to Proceedings of the Royal Society B: For Review Only
8 
 
Notice that to choose an action just one of the two upper thresholds must be passed, whereas to choose 146 
no-action both the lower thresholds must be passed (Figure 1).  147 
The four decision threshold values 6; −7; 6; 	−7 identify the bird’s decision strategy and directly 148 
affect its fitness, by influencing both the response times and the error probabilities. Suppose the bird is 149 
inspecting a caterpillar. The inspection can have three outcomes: the bird recognizes and attacks the prey 150 
or it confuses the caterpillar with either a snake or a millipede. We indicate with = and = the two error 151 
probabilities (the subscripts and superscripts refers to, respectively,  the true and the perceived stimulus). 152 
The probability of correctly recognizing the prey is thus 1 − = − =. Furthermore, we indicate with > , 153 
> , and >  the mean response times during the assessment of caterpillars, snakes and millipedes. Similarly, 154 
we indicate with =, = the probabilities of confusing a snake with a caterpillar or a millipede, with = , =  155 
the probability of confusing a millipede with either a caterpillar or a snake, and with =and = the 156 
probabilities of confusing the snake with either a caterpillar or a millipede. 157 
The fitness of a decision strategy depends on the four threshold values and can be represented as a 158 
function of both the error probabilities and the inspection times.  159 
(a) The fitness of a decision strategy  160 
We define the fitness of a decision strategy as the probability that the bird that adopts this strategy will 161 
survive until the next day. The bird will survive if (i) it manages to catch ? caterpillars and, concomitantly, if 162 
it avoids being predated by both (ii) the sparrow hawk, and (iii) the snake. We assume that the probability 163 
of being predated by the sparrow hawk is directly proportional to the total time spent in searching for food, 164 
with @ being the proportionality constant; whereas the probability of being predated by the snake depends 165 
on the ability of recognizing the snake and on the number of snakes that the bird is expected to inspect 166 
every day. 167 
To compute these quantities, we assume that the bird finds potential preys/predators every A time units. 168 
The spatial distribution of caterpillars, snakes and millipedes is random and the probabilities of finding 169 
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them coincide with their relative abundances in the forest, which is B  (caterpillars), B (snakes), and 170 
B = 1 − B − B (millipedes).  171 
Depending on the decision strategy, the bird will have a probability = and = of confounding a caterpillar 172 
with a snake or a millipede, and thus the expected number of items that the bird will inspect in order to 173 
obtain the daily ratio ? of caterpillars is: 174 
C = DEFEFG.         EQ. 4a 175 
This quantity indirectly affects the probability that the bird will survive to its predators. In fact, the larger 176 
the number of items that the bird must inspect the longer the time it must be exposed to the attack of the 177 
sparrow hawk, which is: 178 
H = C − 1A + HI,        EQ. 4b 179 
where HI is the mean decision time, defined as the weighted sum of the times of all possible decisions:  180 
HI = B> + = AJ + B> + B=>      EQ. 4c 181 
AJ  is a constant and represents the penalty paid by the bird when it erroneously attacks a millipede. The 182 
probability that the bird will be not predated by the sparrow hawk is 1 − @H. 183 
The number of prey inspected daily, p, will affect also the probability that the bird will be killed by a snake. 184 
In fact, every day, the bird is expected to inspect CB snakes. During each encounter, we approximate the 185 
probability that the bird will be eaten by the snake by the expression 186 
ℎ = = + = + 1 − = − =L>.      EQ. 4d 187 
When the bird encounters a snake, it will be killed either if it fails to recognize him (with probability 188 
= + =) or if it does recognize him (with probability 1 − = − =), but fails to escape (with probability 189 
L>). In the latter case, L> describes the increasing predation risk with the increasing time response. 190 
This simple choice is computationally less expensive than the more precise estimate of the predation risk 191 
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involving the mean of g over all decision times. In any case, the probability of surviving to all the snakes 192 
encountered in a day is  1 − ℎMG.   193 
By combining Eq. 4b and 4d, we obtain the probability that the bird that adopts a decision strategy 194 
N = 6, −7 , 6, −7 will survive until the next day: 195 
ON = P1 − @CN − 1A + HINQ -1 − ℎNGMI/.   EQ. 5 196 
(b) Solution procedure 197 
In order to compute the error probabilities =, =, and =, = as well as the expected decision times ts, tc 198 
and tm, we replace the random walk processes in Eq. 1 by continuous-time diffusion processes in the 199 
decision plane. Actually, we have three distinct random walks, and thus diffusion processes, characterized 200 
by the probability distributions of the snake, caterpillar and millipede signals, described in the previous 201 
section. For a given initial signal in the decision plane, a decision is taken by the animal when the sample 202 
path reaches the boundary of the uncertainty region bounded by the decision thresholds.  This is a first-exit 203 
problem, and, for a given initial signal, the probability that the first exit occurs at a particular threshold, as 204 
well as the first exit times, can be computed as explained in A2 of the supplementary materials. Taking the 205 
averages with respect to the initial point distribution (either a snake, a caterpillar or a millipede) yields the 206 
error probabilities and the mean decision times for each choice of the decision thresholds  207 
6; −7; 6;	−7,	which in turn allows to compute the fitness of each strategy. 208 
RESULTS 209 
In our model, the decision strategy is defined by the bottom and the top decision thresholds. Figure 2a 210 
shows the effect of the two bottom thresholds. The maximum payoffs of a decision strategy increase 211 
monotonically with the decrease of both, because the lower their values the lower the risk of mistaking 212 
either a caterpillar or a snake with a millipede. However, since the model assumes that a millipede is 213 
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recognized only when both the bottom thresholds are crossed, their effect is synergistic: the risk of false 214 
negatives is high only when both the bottom thresholds are high. In Figure 2b, we set the bottom 215 
thresholds at their optimal values and analyse the effect of the two top thresholds. In this case, the 216 
expected payoffs shows a strongly asymmetric distribution. In fact, the highest payoffs are found when the 217 
caterpillar top threshold (6∗ = 2) is about one order of magnitude greater than the snake top threshold 218 
(6∗ = 0.2).  219 
The choice of the decision thresholds is the mechanism by which the decision maker can adjust false-220 
positive and false-negative errors in relation to their costs on survival, which depend on the environment. 221 
We focus on two environmental factors: the predator pressure and the uncertainty of prey assessment. 222 
(a) The snake predation pressure  223 
In Figure 3a,c, we show the effect of the relative abundance of snakes and caterpillars on the optimal 224 
decision strategy. In these simulations, the hawk predation risk is kept constant at a moderately low level 225 
(@ = 10E(, but see Fig. S2 in the supplementary materials for the effect of an increase in the hawk 226 
predation risk). When there are no snakes and caterpillars are abundant, snake false positives are much 227 
more costly than caterpillar false positives. For this reason, the optimal top threshold is high along the 228 
snake dimension and lower along the caterpillar dimension (i.e. 6∗ ≫ 6∗). However, it suffices a very low 229 
risk of snake predation (B = 0.01) to bias decision to the opposite direction and to make snake false 230 
positives much more likely than caterpillar false positives. As the snake abundance increases, the decision 231 
bias increases as well: under disproportionally high risks of snake predation (i.e. B > 0.15), a caterpillar 232 
has a 50% probability of being mistaken for a snake (Figure 3c). The higher the rate of snake false positives, 233 
the higher the number of prospective preys to be assessed, the longer the time the bird spends searching 234 
for food and, thus, the higher his risk of being predated by the hawk.  235 
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(b) Uncertainty during prey assessment  236 
Figures 3b and 3d show the effect of assessment uncertainty on the optimal decision strategy. In our 237 
model, uncertainty is described by  , the variance of the independent pieces of information acquired 238 
during inspection. Independent of the assessment accuracy, the optimal snake threshold is always lower 239 
than the optimal caterpillar threshold, making snake false-negatives less likely than caterpillar false-240 
negatives. However, when the assessment is accurate, the two types of errors do not conflict strongly 241 
against each other and the optimal decision strategy keeps both low. As the  uncertainty increases, so it 242 
does their conflict, because to keep low the snake false negatives, the caterpillar false negatives must 243 
necessarily increase. Indeed, the increasing uncertainty causes an increase of the difference between the 244 
likelihoods of the two types of errors and, consequently, an increasing overestimation of the snake 245 
predation risk. An increasing uncertainty in the decision process has the same effect of an increasing risk of 246 
snake predation: in both cases, the snake false negatives become much costlier than the caterpillar false 247 
negatives, favouring an overestimation of the former. 248 
(c) The evolutionary effects of an overestimation of predation risk 249 
When selection favours the evolution of decision mechanisms that overestimate the predation risk in 250 
intermediate predators, preys can take advantage of this bias by evolving phenotypic traits that increase 251 
the probability of false negatives in their predators. In Figure 4, we show the distribution of the caterpillar 252 
false negatives in the prey-predator decision space, when the bird adopts the optimal strategy N∗ =253 
6∗, −7∗, 6∗, −7∗ = −0.2,−5, 2,−5. The probability that the bird gets the caterpillar confused with 254 
either a snake or a millipede is 0.39. A mutation that shifts the position of the caterpillar in either the snake 255 
or the millipede directions is positively selected because of the survival benefits it provides to the mutant 256 
(i.e. the increased rate of false negatives induced in its predator). Indeed, the model suggests that the 257 
maximum benefits are expected when the mutant changes along both dimensions. If selection can favour 258 
the evolution of intimidating deception strategies in caterpillars, it makes very unlikely the evolution of 259 
aggressive mimicry in snakes. In the bird decision space, in fact, snakes lay at the centre of a plateau where 260 
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the probability of being mistaken for a caterpillar is extremely low. A mutation that shifts the snake 261 
towards the caterpillar position would only marginally increase the probability that the snake be 262 
confounded with a caterpillar. 263 
Discussion 264 
In an uncertain world, decision errors are unavoidable, but their negative effects can be at least mitigated 265 
by biasing the probability of error in the least costly direction [8]. For example, when there is uncertainty 266 
about the dangerousness of a prospective prey, a predator is expected to overestimate the risk of attacking 267 
the prey if the costs of false positives (i.e. the perceived prey is actually a predator) are higher than the 268 
costs of false negatives (i.e. the perceived predator is actually a prey). Our model of decision making has 269 
been devised to explore this hypothesis by studying the optimal trade-offs between false-positive and false-270 
negative errors in prey and predator detection. Results are consistent with the predictions of the “error 271 
management theory” [8].  Decisions, in fact, are strongly biased in the direction that minimizes the 272 
probability of failing to recognize a snake (predator) even if this makes very likely the failure of recognizing 273 
a caterpillar (prey). Furthermore, the model predicts the bias to increase with both the increasing risks of 274 
snake predation and the increasing assessment uncertainty and to decrease with the increasing costs of 275 
prey searching. 276 
Since we aimed at exploring the adaptive significance of decision biases and their evolutionary effects, our 277 
modelling approach has been that of integrating function and mechanism within a coherent theoretical 278 
framework [17]. In fact, adaptive decision biases can be viewed only in the light of the constraints imposed 279 
by the cognitive machinery of decision making [16]. The theoretical model, thus, should be based on some 280 
explicit assumptions about not only the rules of decision making but also the mechanisms of information 281 
processing. We made two main assumptions about these mechanisms. First, we assume that noisy 282 
evidence for the testing hypotheses is accumulated over time and that a decision is made when the 283 
evidence for one of the hypotheses reaches a critical threshold [10-12,18-20]. Second, we assume that, 284 
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during assessment of prospective preys/predators, the bird makes the two alternative hypotheses 285 
(caterpillar/not-caterpillar; snake/not-snake) to compete against each other. Both these assumptions have 286 
a robust biological foundation that comes from studies on the neurophysiology of decision making [21-23]. 287 
In particular, Cisek and colleagues [21,23] have provided theoretical and empirical evidence that 288 
perceptual, cognitive and motor processes, rather than interacting serially, work in parallel. According to 289 
this model, the sensory-motor system accumulates information supporting alternative motor responses, 290 
which compete against each other for execution. Although we used the model in a rather specific context 291 
(the bird-caterpillar interaction), this same decision mechanism can be extended to a diversity of choice 292 
contexts. In our model, the bird had to choose among three alternative actions (flee, attack or ignore) and 293 
the decision is basically a three-dimension process (the caterpillar, the snake and the time dimensions). If 294 
the choice had been between two alternative actions (e.g. stay or abandon the foraging patch; approach or 295 
ignore a prospective mate), then decision would have been a two-dimension process. Finally, if we had 296 
reduced decisions to one dimension, by assuming a fixed evaluation time, then our model would have been 297 
simply a variant of a classic signal-detection model [13]. 298 
The decision mechanism is at the same time a result and a constraint of adaptive evolution. If the parallel 299 
processing of alternative actions has been favoured by selection for survival in uncertain and unpredictable 300 
environments, this same mechanism might constrain the evolution of adaptive decision rules. For example, 301 
when the predation risk increases, our model predicts that: (i) the optimal snake decision threshold should 302 
decrease, to keep low the snake false negatives; and (ii) the optimal caterpillar decision threshold should 303 
increase, to keep low the caterpillar false positives. However, this latter change in the decision rules is 304 
adaptive only within the constraints imposed by the decision mechanism. If the predator and prey 305 
hypotheses were tested in a serial rather than in a parallel fashion, so that the ‘caterpillar’ hypothesis was 306 
tested only once the ‘snake’ hypothesis had been rejected, then the optimal caterpillar threshold would 307 
have depended only on the costs of confounding a caterpillar with a millipede and would have been much 308 
lower than the optimal threshold observed in the parallel processing. In this sense, the negative association 309 
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between the snake and the caterpillar decision thresholds is the adaptive side-effect of the parallel 310 
processing. 311 
While, from the bird’s point of view, the asymmetry of the decision thresholds might be adaptive, from the 312 
caterpillar’s point view, it is a salient feature of the predator’s ‘psychology’ [24], which the caterpillar can 313 
exploit to increase its chances of survival in case of detection. In particular, our model shows that the 314 
asymmetry of the decision thresholds causes an asymmetric distribution of false-negative errors in the 315 
snake-caterpillar decision plane so that the caterpillar resides on the steepest hillside of the decision 316 
landscape. If we assume that the prey fitness is strictly associated with its probability to induce false 317 
negatives in the predator, then small changes in the position of the prey may be expected to have strong 318 
effects on its fitness. Changes can involve traits perceived along either the snake or the caterpillar 319 
dimension, but the model suggests that the most effective ones are those that occur along both 320 
dimensions. Eye-like markings in many terrestrial [25,26] and aquatic animals [27] are thought to have 321 
evolved as an anti-predator adaptation. Three hypotheses have been proposed to explain their functional 322 
significance [26]. According to the “deflection hypothesis”, eyespots are fake eyes that evolved to draw 323 
predators attacks to the least vulnerable regions of the prey’s body. In this case, they are thought to modify 324 
the form, but not the quality of the perceived prey [28,29]. The other two hypotheses, in contrast, suggest 325 
that eyespots evolved to modify the perceived identity of a prospective prey. The mimicry hypothesis 326 
suggests that eyespots intimidate predators because they perceive these traits as the eyes of their own 327 
predators, whereas the conspicuous signal hypothesis suggests that eyespots intimidate predators simply 328 
because they fail to recognize the animal as a palatable prey. These latter two hypotheses are often seen as 329 
alternative to each other and some empirical studies have tried to discriminate between them, with 330 
contrasting results [30,31]. Our model, however, suggests that conspicuousness and mimicry act 331 
simultaneously and synergistically on the decision-making process, so that it might be difficult, if not 332 
meaningless, trying to disentangle their effects. 333 
As the little, clever mouse of the Gruffalo’s tale teaches us, fear is in the eyes of beholder and frightened 334 
eyes are predisposed to overestimate the real risks. Thus, when natural selection favours fear in predators, 335 
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it may also favour intimidating bluffs in preys, as long as the expected costs that predators pay by calling an 336 
erroneously-suspected bluff are much higher than those they pay by being eventually bluffed. Our model 337 
suggests that the asymmetric costs of decision errors might have a double effect on the prey-predator 338 
interaction: it may favour the evolution of intimidating-deception strategies in preys, but constrain the 339 
evolution of alluring-deception strategies in predators. In our model, in fact, the bird is more likely to be 340 
frightened by a snake-mimicking caterpillar than to be lured by a caterpillar-mimicking snake. Put another 341 
words, our model makes the testable prediction that a bluff is more likely to succeed if it threatens costs 342 
than if it promises benefits. However, the evolutionary success of a deception strategy depends not only on 343 
the probability of succeeding in deception, but also on the costs of failing. The caudal luring of a snake 344 
might have a low success probability in attracting lizards or birds [32], but the costs of failure are so low 345 
that natural selection might still favour this predator strategy despite the constraining cognitive biases. In 346 
contrast, the intimidating-deception strategy of a prey has very high failure costs and it may evolve 347 
precisely because the cognitive biases have always maintained a high probability of success. 348 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 425 
Figure 1. Graphical representation of the decision-making mechanism. The decision plane is defined by the 426 
snake and the caterpillar axes. Since assessment is uncertain, single pieces of sensory information about 427 
snakes (red), caterpillars (green) and millipedes (gray) show bi-normal, overlapping distributions 428 
(concentric circles). Colored arrows show the direction and the drift of the diffusion process that describes 429 
the decision-making mechanism. The bird will flee if the decision variable enter the ‘snake’ region, attack if 430 
in the ‘caterpillar’ region and it will simply stop the assessment and start a new search, if the decision 431 
variable reaches the ‘millipede’ region. In the unlikely case that the decision variable falls in either the top-432 
left or the top-right or the bottom-right rectangle, we assume there is a 0.5 probability respectively to 433 
attack or to ignore the stimulus, to attack or flee from the stimulus, and to flee or ignore the stimulus. The 434 
concatenated black arrows show an example of how evidence accumulates over time during a decision: 435 
after four time units, the decision variable has crossed the snake threshold, activating the flee motor 436 
response. 437 
Figure 2. Decision-strategy payoffs. A decision strategy is defined by four variables, which are, respectively, 438 
the bottom and the top decision thresholds along the caterpillar and the snake dimension. In (a), we 439 
compute the payoffs of all the combinations of the four decision variables and plot their maximum values 440 
against the two bottom thresholds. Maximum payoffs increase monotonically with the decrease of both 441 
the snake and the caterpillar bottom thresholds. In (b), we set the bottom thresholds at their optimal 442 
values (i.e. −7 = −7 = −5), and show payoffs variation as a function of the two top thresholds (6 and 443 
6V). Optimal decisions are made when the caterpillar top threshold is much greater than the snake top 444 
threshold, making false-negative errors in prey recognition much more likely than false-positive errors. All 445 
the simulations were run using the following set of parameters: " = 1;	  = 1;	B = 0.4; B = 0.1; 	? =446 
20; 	A = 15; @ = 10E(;  L> = XXYZ. 447 
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Figure 3. The effect of predation risk and assessment uncertainty on the optimal decision strategy. The 448 
optimal top-decision thresholds along the snake (filled circles) and the caterpillar (open circles) dimension 449 
is shown as a function, respectively, of the predation risk (a) and the uncertainty level (b). An increase of 450 
either the predation risk or the uncertainty causes a decrease of the snake thresholds and an increase of 451 
the caterpillar thresholds. As a consequence, the false negative errors in snake recognition decrease and 452 
the false negative errors in caterpillar recognition increase with the increasing of both the predation risk (c) 453 
and the uncertainty level (d). In these simulations, the parameters are those reported in Figure 2. 454 
Figure 4. Contour plot of the bird’s decision landscape. Isolines show the probabilities that the object 455 
described by the bi-normal density function [, 	, \ = \ = 1 be perceived either as a snake (thus, 456 
eliciting a flee motor response) or as a millipede (thus, eliciting no motor response). The positions of the 457 
“normal” caterpillar in the bird’s decision plane have the binormal distribution  [ = −1, 	 = 1, \ = \ =458 
1. A “mutant” caterpillar with [ = −1 + A, 	 = 1 + ], \ = \ = 1 will be favoured by natural 459 
selection if the mutation increases the probability of bird’s false negatives. The three arrows from the 460 
“normal” caterpillar show the increase in false negatives of a mutant when (i)  A = 1	and ] = 0, horizontal 461 
arrow;  (ii)  A = 0	and ] = −1, vertical arrow; and iii)  A = 1	and ] = −1, oblique arrow. Analogously, the 462 
arrow from the “normal” snake shows the increase in false negatives due to a mutation that causes a shift 463 
in the snake bi-normal distribution of A = 1	and ] = −1.  464 
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